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SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE NEW YORK LAWS AND
PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE CRIMINALLY INSANE
AND MENTALLY DEFECTIVE OFFENDERS
Morris Ploscowe
This and the following nine full articles and digests of articles were contributed
to the program of the Association for the Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders
(APTO) which was given on November 17, 1951, in New York City in recognition
of Dr. Robert H. Gault's forty years as Editor of this Journal. The contribution
by Dr. Benjamin Karpman on sex criminals in Number One of the present volume
belongs in this group.
The author of the first article below is a New York City Magistrate, Executive
Director of the American Bar Association's Committee on Organized Crime, Editor
of Organized Crime and Law Enforcement, and author of SEX AND THE LAW.
-EDiToR.
The following changes are recommended in our present laws and
procedures dealing with mentally disordered and mentally deficient
persons who are charged with the commission of crimes.
I.
A psychiatric examination should be required for the following cate-
gories of offenders:
a. All persons indicted for murder.
b. All persons indicted for a felony who have previously been
indicted or convicted of felonies.
c. All persons indicted for forcible rape or forcible crimes against
nature.
d. All persons against whom an information has been filed, or
who have been indicted for impairing or endangering the morals of
a minor, carnal abuse of a child, or indecent exposure, who have once
before been charged with similar crimes.
It would be highly desirable if all persons under indictment were
submitted to routine mental examinations after conviction. This is
done at the present time as a matter of routine only in the Court of
General Sessions through its Psychiatric Clinic. This practice makes
it possible to detect the psychotic and mentally defective offenders
who may be sent to mental institutions instead of to prisons or peniten-
tiaries, where they will be a source of serious difficulties for correc-
tional authorities. A finding of psychosis or mental deficiency after
conviction, moreover, makes it possible to take immediate steps to set
aside convictions. Under our statutes a man cannot be tried for crime
if he is in such a state of imbecility, idiocy or insanity that he is in-
capable of understanding the charge or of making his defense thereto.
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A routine mental examination after conviction, even where defend-
ants are neither psychotic nor mentally defective, has the further
advantage that it produces considerable data about the personality of
a defendant, which is of great value to a judge in the determination
of sentence.
However, at the present time, it is not feasible to require the routine
mental examination of all convicted offenders. The psychiatric clinics
and facilities for undertaking such a task are presently not available,
nor does it seem likely that they will be available in the foreseeable
future. If psychiatric examinations must be restricted, because of lack
of facilities, then they should be required only for those categories of
offenders, who are likely to be mentally abnormal or who, because
of their behavior patterns, may be dangerous to the community. We
believe that mental examinations should be required after conviction
for certain categories of sex offenders and for offenders who are begin-
ning to develop patterns of repetitive criminality. In addition, psychi-
atric examination before trial should be required in all cases where
defendants have been indicted for murder.
At the present time the law provides that a Court or Magistrate
may commit a defendant charged with crime for psychiatric examina-
tion to a public hospital when he is "in such a state of idiocy, imbecility
or insanity that he is incapable of understanding the charge or of
making his defense."' This gives a Judge discretion as to when to
order a psychiatric examination. Generally such examinations are
ordered sparingly, and only in cases where the defendant has shown
clear signs of mental aberration. The result is that mental disorders
and deficiencies of large numbers of offenders remain undiscovered by
the Court. This may cause serious difficulties in the disposition of
criminal cases. This is apparent from the case of People v. Wvolfe.2
Louis Wolfe was indicted for the killing of his wife in 1943. At
his trial in 1944 he refused to permit his counsel to interpose a defense
of insanity. The defendant was found guilty of murder in the first
degree, which made a death sentence mandatory. Before sentence
could be pronounced, however, Wolfe showed signs of mental aberra-
tion and was committed for examination. He was suffering from
schizophrenia of the paranoid type and was ordered committed to
Matteawan State Hospital. In 1950, six years later, he was returned
from Matteawan to the Kings County Court on a certificate that he
was no longer insane. Although the psychiatrists from Matteawan
1. Sec. 870, 658 et seq., Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. 1950, 102 N.Y. S, 2d., 12.
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changed their opinions with respect to Wolfe's mental condition during
the course of the hearings, the original report from Matteawan, that
he was sane, was confirmed and Wolfe, therefore, had to be sentenced
to death. After this judgment, a motion was made by his attorney
asking for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The newly discovered evidence was that all during his trial in 1944,
Wolfe was in such a state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity as to be
incapable of understanding the proceedings or of making his defense
thereto. The motion for a new trial was granted, and the trial and
the death sentence were therefore quashed.
It is most extraordinary that this motion for a new trial was not
made immediately after the original commitment to Matteawan, in
1944. Nevertheless, it is apparent that if the law had required a mental
examination in advance of trial in the case of all persons indicted for
murder, as we have suggested, the tremendous expense to the State
of Wolfe's trial and the subsequent proceedings might have been
avoided. It would have been apparent from the beginning that Louis
Wolfe was a psychotic in need of mental treatment and not a criminal
who deliberately beat his wife to death with a shoe.
II
The McNaughten Rule should be abandoned in New York as a
test of criminal responsibility. If a person is definitely psychotic, or
a mental defective, the law should concern itself with his mental con-
dition and his dangerousness to the community rather than the criminal
behavior with which he is charged. The test of liability for crime in
the case of persons allegedly insane or mentally- deficient should be the
presence or absence of a clinically recognizable mental disorder
(psychosis) or mental deficiency (imbecility or idiocy) at the time the
crime was committed. When a psychotic or mental defective commits
a crime, he should be confined in a mental hospital or mental institu-
tion until he is cured and until he is no longer dangerous. The psychotic
or mentally defective offender should be discharged from the hospital
only after a hearing in the Court which had jurisdiction of the charge
of crime.
Sec. 1120 of the Penal Law provides that a person is not excused
from liability on the grounds of insanity, idiocy or imbecility, except
upon proof that at the time of the commission of the criminal act he
was laboring under such a defect of reason as (1) not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing or (2) not to know that
the act was wrong.
[Vol. 43314
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Sec. 34 of the Penal Law provides, moreover, that "A morbid
propensity to commit prohibited acts, existing in the mind of a person
who is not shown to have been incapable of knowing the wrongfulness
of such acts, forms no defense to a prosecution therefor."
It is apparent from the aforementioned that New York has expressly
adopted the rule of the McNaghten case.3 New York has also expressly
repudiated the notion that so-called irresistible impulses to commit
crimes, may excuse from criminal liability.
We believe that the rules governing the criminal responsibility of
the insane and the mentally defective in New York, should be modified
along the lines that we have indicated. In support of our position we
urge the following:
A. The Rule in McNaghten's case, and the rules against irresistible
impulses as a defense to crime, run counter to fundamental notions
of moral responsibility as a basis for punishment or penal treatment.
The Anglo-American criminal law has been based traditionally upon
the concept that men are free moral beings who, with knowledge of
right and wrong, choose to do wrong and therefore should be punished.
There is an interchangeability of what might be called penal and
moral responsibility. This was expressed long ago by Sir Matthew
Hale who stated:
Man is naturally endowed with these two great faculties, understanding and
liberty of will and therefore is a subject properly capable of a law ..... .and
consequently obnoxious to guilt and punishment for violation of that law which
in respect of these two great faculties he hath a capacity to obey! The consent
of the will is that which renders human actions either commendable or cul-
pable ......
It is a little difficult to see how there can be moral responsibility for
crime if the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder affecting his
volition, such as pyromania or kleptomania, in which there is a strong
compulsion to do the prohibited act of stealing or setting fires. Nor
is it apparent how a mentally disordered person, suffering from a
delusion or a hallucination, who may know the wrongfulness of his
act, or an epileptic who, during a seizure, may have an inadequate
knowledge of a criminal act, can be held morally responsible for this
crime. Actually, in these situations, the law pays only lip service to
the doctrines of moral responsibility. It acts under the belief that the
general security requires that even mentally disordered and mentally
deficient persons must be subjected to punishment for crime, where there
S. 1843, 10 Clark and F.N. 200.
4. History of the Pleas of the Crown I, 14-15, 1736.
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is some knowledge, even though it may be defective, of the nature
and quality of the criminal act and of its wrongfulness.
We do not believe that the punishment of insane and mentally defi-
cient offenders is required by the general security. If such persons are
dangerous, they require the attention of psychiatrists and doctors
rather than of jailors and prison wardens.
B. The rules of Sec. 1120 and Sec. 34 of the Penal Law are largely
ignored at the present time as a basis for determining the criminal
liability of the mentally disordered and the mentally deficient.
We have seen that Sections 870 and 658 et seq. of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure prohibit the trial of persons who are incapable of under-
standing the charges against them or of making their defense thereto.
Under these sections, the test is whether the mental disorder or the
mental deficiency of the defendant has so impaired his understanding,
that it is unfair to try him for the crime with which he is charged.
This is quite a different test than the knowledge of right and wrong
and of the nature and quality of the act required by the McNaghten
rules. The tests of 870 and 658 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
are usually interpreted by psychiatrists, who examine defendants before
trial, to mean the presence or absence of a clinical psychosis or of
mental deficiency of the grade of idiocy or imbecility. If these forms
of mental aberration are present, then the defendant is certified as
being incapable of understanding the charge or proceeding. He is then
committed to a hospital for the insane or for the mentally deficient,
which is either under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental
Hygiene or the Department of Correction.
In the case of minor offenses, this commitment is a final disposition
and the charge is abated 5. In the case of felonies, a defendant must
technically be returned to the Court where the charge is pending, if he
has sufficiently recovered his reason, so that he can intelligently par-
ticipate in the trial.6 Generally, however, except in murder cases, a
commitment to a mental hospital is for all practical purposes a final
disposition of the criminal charge. If the defendant has a psychosis,
recovery may take considerable time. Mental deficiency, moreover,
defies the best efforts of doctors. The passage of time never helps
the case of the prosecution. The longer the interval between the com-
mission of the crime and the date of the trial, the greater is the reluct-
ance to prosecute. Under these circumstances the commitment of the
5. 873 Code of Criminal Procedure.
6. 662 b Code of Criminal Procedure.
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psychotic or the mentally defective, normally ends the criminal pro-
ceeding in both misdemeanors and felonies.
If the psychotic offender has been tried, convicted and sentenced to
a penal institution, he is usually transferred by the correctional authori-
ties to a mental hospital. Here the major concern is not his crime,
but his mental condition. Thus, if his sentence expires while he is in
the mental hospital and he is still dangerous, he may be held in confine-
ment under the provisions of the Mental Hygiene Law.
Even in murder cases, a defendant found psychotic or mentally
defective by the psychiatrist who examines him, may not be tried even
though he may understand the nature and quality of his act and its
wrongfulness. Until the offender has recovered sufficiently from his
psychosis, so that he can intelligently participate in his defense, the
trial for murder may not proceed. If such an individual is in fact
tried and convicted of murder, and then found to be psychotic, the
law forbids his execution even though sentence of death may have been
imposed. The Wolfe case is an example.
We believe, therefore, that the modifications that we have urged
of our rules concerning criminal responsibility of mentally disordered
and mentally deficient offenders, are not too radical a departure from
present practices.
C. The concept that mental disease, as such, where it is a clinically
recognizable psychosis, and mental deficiency of the grade of idiocy
and imbecility, should excuse from criminal responsibility, has respect-
able authority behind it. The rule of the McNaghten case with respect
to the knowledge of the wrongfulness and the nature and quality of
the criminal act, were repudiated as tests of responsibility as early as
1871 in the New Hampshire case of State v. Jones.7 That case held
that a jury was properly instructed in its deliberations on a charge of
murder when the Court charged the jury: "If the defendant killed
his wife in a manner that would be criminal and unlawful if the de-
fendant were sane, the verdict should be not guilty by reason of insanity,
if the killing was the off-spring or product of mental disease in the
defendant." The Court felt that any further instructions to the jury
would invade its province."
III
The law of murder should be amended so as to provide a penalty
less than death for killings from so-called praiseworthy motives.
7. 50 N.H. 369.
8. See discussion in WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW, 81 et seq.
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When a child kills a parent, or a parent kills a child, who is incur-
ably ill, or a husband kills the paramour of his wife, there is great
reluctance to apply the drastic penalties of murder to such homicides.
In order to relieve the offender of criminal responsibility in such cases,
the plea of temporary insanity is frequently entered. It is usually alleged
that, at the time of the crime, the defendant acted under such great
mental stress and mental tension, that he was unable to know the
nature and quality of the act that he was doing, or that the act was
wrong. Immediately after the homicide, the tension and mental stress
is eliminated, and the defendant is able to function like any other
human being.
There can be no question that pleas of insanity in the so-called unwrit-
ten law cases, and in cases of killing from so-called praiseworthy
motives, are specious. They are entered merely to achieve a result,
to save the offender from the death penalty for murder. If the punish-
ment for murder were more flexible, and permitted a certain discretion
to the Judge, there would not be the same pressure upon lawyers and
defendants to enter pleas of temporary insanity in the aforementioned
type of cases. Accordingly, we feel that, where a person is killed, and
the killing occurs from what might be deemed praiseworthy motives
(the concern of a parent for a child, or of a child for a parent, the
concern of a man or woman to protect his honor and integrity, etc.),
the jury should be instructed to make a determination with respect to
the motives which induced the killing. A finding by the jury that the
killing occurred from "praiseworthy motives" as defined by the Court,
should necessarily eliminate the death penalty. The Judge should then,
under the statutory scheme that we favor, be able to impose a prison
sentence for any term up to life or, he should be able to suspend sentence
and place the defendant on probation.
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